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De facto exchange rate regimes and inflation 
targeting in Latin America: Some empirical evidence 
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cecilia bermúdez1
n  Abstract: We estimate de facto exchange rate systems for the seven most important 
Latin American economies (LA-7) between 1999 and 2011. We use the methodology 
developed by Zeileis, Shah and Patnaik (2010) because, unlike others developed so 
far, it captures the “fine” structure behind the regimes and identifies structural breaks 
at sharp dates. We conclude that the countries listed in AL-7 have moved towards more 
flexible exchange rate systems, though there are differences in the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility between countries that have implemented inflation target schemes and 
those that have not. 
n  Resumen: Este trabajo estima los regímenes cambiarios de facto de las siete econo-
mías más importantes de América Latina (LA-7) entre 1999 y 2011. Se utiliza la me-
todología de Zeileis, Shah y Patnaik (2010) que, a diferencia de otras desarrolladas 
hasta el momento, captura la estructura “fina” de los regímenes cambiarios de facto 
e identifica quiebres estructurales en fechas precisas. Se concluye que los países de 
AL-7 han logrado converger hacia un mayor grado de flotación cambiaria de facto, 
aunque existen diferencias en el grado de flexibilidad cambiaria entre los países que 
han adoptado esquemas de metas inflacionarias y los que carecen de ellas.
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n  Introducción
The difference between the exchange rate regime officially declared by central banks 
to the IMF (de jure) and the one in operation (de facto) has given rise to alternative 
methods to identify the observed exchange rate regimes.2 The increasing interest in as-
1 Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS)-Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones 
Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) . Departamento de Economía, Universidad Nacional del Sur. E-mail ad-
dress: cbermudez@uns.edu.ar 
2 See, for instance, Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturze-
negger (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2006), Frankel and Wei (1994) and 
Frankel and Xie (2009).
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sessing the functioning of exchange rates regimes stems from the fact that the empirical 
research based on de jure classification yield unsatisfactory results in terms of at least 
two issues: the effect of nominal exchange rates on real variables and the effectiveness 
of intermediate regimes. 
The standard literature on the relevance of exchange rates supports the “classical 
dichotomy”, so it becomes inconsequential whether countries choose fixed or floating 
regimes.3 Nonetheless, policy discussions, central banks’ practice and a great deal of 
empirical literature suggest a strong link between exchange rates and real variables. 
However, there is no consensus about what regime a country should adopt. While the 
Mundellian approach argues in favor of floating regimes –because of their ability to 
absorb shocks–, the “nominal anchor view” fosters fixed exchange rates because they 
could cover a “deficit” in monetary credibility. 
The relevance of exchange rates became a central topic during the nineties. Finan-
cial integration gave rise to the “bipolar view” of exchange rates, which suggested that 
intermediate regimes would tend to disappear, as large swings in capital flows would 
make them vulnerable to speculative currency attacks. As a result, it was argued that 
countries should move either to pure flexible regimes or to hard pegs (Eichengreen et 
al., 1994; Fischer, 2001). 
The same argument was employed to explain the theoretical functioning of infla-
tion targeting schemes. If the monetary authority has an inflation goal, it cannot target 
other indicators because it has only one policy instrument: the interest rate. Thus, only 
flexible exchange rates are possible within an IT framework (Agenor, 2002). This no-
tion goes against central banks’ practice and the empirical fact that foreign exchange 
intervention has not been abandoned completely, and has actually helped in smoothing 
the effects of the financial turmoil of 2008 (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2011). 
However, these conclusions might have arisen from empirical work based on de jure 
classification of exchange rates (Edwards and Savastano, 1999; Rogoff et al., 2004). 
Overcoming this weakness has been the agenda of a large literature that has developed 
different methods to classify exchange rate regimes. By using de facto classifications, 
these research lines do not find evidence to support the “classical dichotomy” (Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger; 2003; Bailliu et al., 2001) or the “bipolar view” of exchange 
rate regimes (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2003). Moreover, de 
facto intermediate regimes could turn to be effective in reducing excessive exchange 
rate volatility, even under IT frameworks (Chang, 2008; Edwards, 2006). Although 
there is a great deal of literature on de facto classifications and its consequences, most 
of the studies focus on emerging market economies or Asian countries. For Latin Amer-
ica there are a few results from panel data estimations or empirical study cases for 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
This paper makes an attempt to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the de 
facto exchange rate regimes of the seven largest economies in Latin America. We are 
interested in addressing two issues concerning exchange rate regimes. Firstly, there 
3  This view has some empirical support. See, for instance, Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Backus and Smith 
(1993).
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might have been changes in the exchange rate regimes in the last decade that could be 
reflecting turns in the underlying monetary and exchange rate policies. Consequently, 
we attempt to match the structural breaks yielded by the model with the actual practice 
of the monetary authorities in each sub-period identified by the model. Secondly, these 
economies may have moved towards more flexible regimes, especially those that have 
adopted inflation targeting. In Latin America, the movement towards these schemes 
began in the early 1990s, but full-fledged ones were adopted only in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, following the 1998 financial crisis. Therefore, we analyze if there are dif-
ferences in the flexibility of the exchange rate regimes between economies that have 
adopted IT schemes and those that have not, and also between the inflation targeters. 
To accomplish our goals, we use a data-driven method for classifying de facto 
exchange rate regimes developed by Zeileis, Shah and Patnaik (2010). While other 
classifications can only distinguish between “floaters”, “intermediate” or “fixers”, the 
method employed in this work has the advantage of yielding a continuous measure of 
the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regimes, thus allowing an analysis based 
on a “finer structure” of the regimes. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section De facto classifica-
tions of exchange rate regimes and IT schemes we survey the literature on de facto 
exchange rate regimes and their link with inflation targeting. In Section Empirical 
strategy we present the empirical strategy, followed by the results in Section Exchange 
rate regimes estimations. Section Discussion of results: exchange rate regimes in Latin 
America presents a discussion and interpretation of the results and, finally, we present 
some final remarks concerning our results. 
n  De facto classifications of exchange rate regimes and IT schemes
There is a general consensus in the literature that de facto classifications of exchange 
rate regimes have yielded quite unsatisfactory results when using the de jure coding. 
In particular, the “bipolar view” is no longer supported when using de facto classifica-
tions, as officially pure regimes are often intervened with different purposes and results. 
In this regard, Frankel (1999) and Ghosh, et al., (2003) focus on countries with 
regimes reported as pegs, and find that their central banks often undergo frequent de-
valuations in order to maintain or enhance competitiveness. Conversely, Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) analyze a group of countries with de jure flexible regimes, and find 
that they exhibit what the authors have called “fear of floating”: in countries with a 
high degree of financial dollarization, the monetary authority has strong incentives to 
intervene in the exchange rate market to reduce exchange rate volatility, which could 
have a negative impact on the balance sheets of the agents. 
The empirical literature on inflation targeting also aims at de facto intermediate re-
gimes to explain the adoption and functioning of idiosyncratic IT schemes in developing 
economies. The standard central bank practice argues that pure floating regimes are a pre-
requisite for adopting inflation targeting (Agenor, 2002). However, there is evidence that 
central banks of emerging economies tend to intervene in their foreign exchange markets, 
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even under an IT framework. Chang (2008) reviews the experience of Latin American 
central banks that have adopted IT schemes, and finds that their exchange rates regimes 
are actually less flexible than what could be the conventional wisdom about inflation tar-
geting. In turn, Mohanty and Klau (2004) use a standard open economy reaction function 
to analyze the behavior of IT central banks of emerging market economies, and show that 
the interest rate responds strongly to the exchange rate and, in some cases, the response is 
higher than that to changes in inflation or output gap.
There are also study cases for certain countries that show similar results. Hammer-
man (2005) runs a VAR model for Chile and Poland, and finds that Polish monetary 
policy has a clear break when the exchange rate as the nominal anchor is replaced by 
inflation targeting; yet, it was not abandoned completely. For Chile, inflation targeting 
was in place for the entire sample period, but there is evidence of active exchange rate 
policy during the international financial turmoil. In turn, Domaç and Mendoza (2004) 
analyze whether foreign exchange interventions by the Banks of Mexico and Turkey 
have been effective in reducing volatility, and whether this has helped achieving their 
targets. Their results suggest that foreign exchange interventions in these countries 
have decreased exchange rate volatility at no costs in terms of the attainment of their 
annual inflation objectives.
These results highlight the importance of the exchange rate as a source of shock 
and, therefore, the relevance of its management in emerging countries, even in those 
with IT schemes. 
n  Empirical strategy
Data-driven methods for classifying exchange rate regimes are often based on al-
gorithms that involve ad hoc assumptions and have weak statistical foundations. In 
this regard, we employ Zeileis et al. (2010) approach, in which a de facto exchange 
rate regime classification –à la Frankel-Wei– is complemented by sound inferential 
techniques for evaluating the stability of the regimes in terms of the regression coef-
ficients and the error variance. The framework involves three stages: 1) setting up the 
econometric model; 2) testing the stability of the parameters; and 3) establishing a 
dating procedure.
The econometric model
We run the standard linear regression model popularized by Frankel and Wei (1994) 
(1)  , ..., ,y x u i n1i iT ib= + =^ h
in which yi are the returns of the target currency and the xi are vectors of returns for 
a basket of c currencies –the US dollar (USD), the Japanese Yen (JPY), the British 
sterling pound (GBP) and the Euro (EUR)– plus a constant. For both yi and xi in (1), 
log-difference returns (in percent) of different currencies are used, as computed by 
log logp p100 i i 1$ - -^ h, where pi  stands for the value of a currency at time i in a suit-
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able numeraire.4 Frankel and Wei (1994) use the Swiss Franc as the numeraire, but in 
this work we choose to use Special Drawing Rights because flexible exchange rate 
regimes may be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire (Zeileis et al., 2010).
The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows. When a country has a fixed ex-
change rate, one coefficient is 1 and the remaining ones are zero, and the error variance 
is 02v = . When a country runs a pegged exchange rate against one currency, one 
coefficient is near 1, the remaining ones are near zero, and 2v  takes low values. With 
a basket peg, 2v  takes low values and the coefficients correspond to the weights of the 
basket. With a floating rate, 2v  is high, and the values reflect the natural current ac-
count and capital account linkages of the country. Consequently, the error variance, 2v
or alternatively, the associated R2 value, reflects the degree of pegging. R2 values near 
99% are usual for fixed regimes, while lower values are obtained for floating schemes.
Testing the stability of the parameters
An obstacle in establishing the exchange rate regime is that it is often not known if and 
when shifts occur. These –rather than smooth transitions– are particularly important 
because changes in the exchange rate regime typically stem from policy interventions 
of the central bank.
Although structural changes techniques are well developed for OLS models, RSS-
based tests, such as Bai-Perron (2003), are insensitive to changes in 2v .5 This is rather 
inconvenient when estimating and testing exchange rate regimes, as the error variance 
represents the flexibility of the exchange rate regime in operation. In this regard, we 
adopt Zeileis et al. (2010) alternative to explicitly include 2v  as a full parameter, by 
adopting a quasi-normal model with density6:
  , , / /f y x y xT2b v z b v v= -^ ^^h h h
where  .z^ h is the standard normal density function. This has the full combined pa-
rameter  ,T T2i b v= ^ h  of length k c 2= +  (c currency coefficients, intercept, and vari-
ance). By adding the error variance as a full model parameter, parameter stability can 
be assessed jointly for b  and 2v . Then the empirical estimating functions for the cor-
responding ML estimates are:
  , ,y x y x xiT} b b= -b ^ ^h h
4 The reason to work in terms of changes rather than levels is the likelihood of non-stationarity. Working in 
changes not only allows to go beyond the usual econometric concern about this series, but also permits us to 
include a constant term to allow for the likelihood of a trend appreciation or depreciation (a key question of 
interest in examining exchange rate regimes).
5 Consequently, these tests tend to yield fewer breakpoints that reflect only changes in the intercept and/or the 
regression coefficients. Additionally, there are other issues related with the comparability of these tests with 
Zeileis et al. approach. For example, if we applied the Quandt Likelihood Ratio test, we would lose the poten-
tial breakpoints at the beginning of the sample (associated with major devaluations in some countries), as the 
conventional choice is to trim 15% of the observations from each end of the sample. However, the results of 
the QLR test are available under request.
6 We use the open codes for the R system included in strucchange and fxregime packages. Available at: http://
CRAN.R-project.org/ and http://R-Forge.R-project.org/.
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  , , ,y x y xiT2 2 22} b v b v= - -v ^ ^h h
The stability of the parameters b  and 2v  can be assessed by testing whether the em-
pirical estimating functions i}t  differ systematically from their zero mean. To capture 
systematic deviations, the empirical fluctuation process of scaled cumulative sums of 
empirical estimating functions is computed:









/2/ n2^ ^h hW X/
   
where  BW  is allowed to be a HAC estimator of the parameters. The empirical fluctua-
tion process (efp) –defined as the decorrelated partial sum process of the empirical es-
timating functions– is governed by the central limit theorem under the null hypothesis 
of parameter stability. If the efp crosses the theoretical boundaries, the fluctuation is 
improbably large, so the null is rejected. The statistic used to test this hypothesis is 
a double maximum statistic that allows for both identification of potential structural 
instability in time and independent components of the epf process:
   /max max epf i n,..., ,...,i n j k j1 1= = ^ h
where /epf i nj ^ h is an n x k array for finite samples, with i=1,…,n corresponding to time 
points and j=1,…,k to the independent components of the process (i.e., components of 
the parameter vector under the null hypothesis of stability). The /epf i nj ^ h which crosses 
some absolute critical value, can be regarded as violating the hypothesis of stability 
(Zeileis et al., 2010).
Dating procedure
If there is evidence for parameter instability in the regression model, the next step is to 
figure out when and how the parameters changed. We use Zeileis et al. (2010) modified 
version of the Bai-Perron’s (2003) procedure for estimating the breakpoints of a linear 
regression. In order to exploit changes in the error variance, the authors use the same 
dynamic programming algorithm but based on a different additive objective function: 
the negative log-likelihood from a normal model. 
For a fixed given number of breaks m, the optimal number of breaks (log-likelihood) 
can be found using standard techniques for model selection, e.g., information criteria 
or sequential tests. Through this, dates of structural change in the exchange rate regime 
are identified. For each country, a set of sub-periods are identified. In each sub-period, 
the regression R2 serves as a summary statistic about exchange rate flexibility. Values 
near 1 convey tight pegs. Floating rates take lower values.
The dataset and descriptive statistics
The dataset consists of the following 7 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. We use weekly currency returns data from January, 1999, 
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to December, 2011.7 The currencies include the US dollar, the Japanese Yen, the British 
sterling pound and the Euro. The Special Drawing Rights is the numeraire. The data 
is provided by UBC’s Sauder School of Business (available at: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/
data.html). We denote currency returns with their ISO 4217 abbreviations. 
A first glance at the data evinces the peculiarities of the period under study. After 
decades of public deficit financed through money creation, hyperinflation episodes and 
exchange rate crises, LA-7 economies have achieved sustained economic growth with 
low inflation levels. However, as shown in Table 1, there are some differences between 
countries that have adopted IT schemes (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) 
and those that have other monetary policy frameworks (Argentina and Venezuela). On 
average, inflation rates have been almost four times lower in inflation targeters (hereon 
ITers), while money growth is lower by half the rate of Non-IT countries (Non-ITers).
Table 1
LA-7 descriptive statistics of some key macroeconomic variables (1999-2011)










Non-IT Argentina 2.9 14.0 5.4 16.0 --
Venezuela 1.1 22.3 4.3 36.6 --
Non-IT Averages 2.0 18.2 4.8 26.3 --
IT Brazil 2.2 6.5 1.5 17.2 43.3
Chile 2.7 3.3 1.2 8.8 5.9
Colombia 2.0 6.1 0.9 13.8 21.7
Mexico 1.2 5.8 1.0 10.0 9.9
Peru 4.0 2.6 1.2 10.0 73.7
IT Averages 2.4 4.9 1.18 12.0 30.9
Source: author’s calculations based on CEPALSTAT. Cumulative intervention is calculated for 2000-2011. It is 
calculated as the sum of purchases and sales of US dollars in foreign exchange markets, and expressed as a per-
centage of the average GDP for the period.
Moreover, ITers have lower inflation rates and volatility, as measured by the stan-
dard deviation of the inflation rate. However, ITers are far from being a homogeneous 
group in terms of foreign exchange intervention, as shown in the last column of Table 
1. If intervention is associated to movements in the exchange rate –i.e., it is not only 
motivated by reserve accumulation– then these differences should be reflected in the 
7 The use of weekly –instead of monthly– data is proper in this case, as there are daily events that generate 
abnormal returns. When structural changes are present in the data, the literature uses high frequency data 
because of the higher power of the statistical tests. Morse (1984) examines this issue for security returns and 
argues: “The return effect of a shift in the coefficients is accentuated when a lower frequency is used. The 
increased bias and variance for monthly data occur because the structural shift operates for a longer period. 
No direct comparisons of t-statistics can be made because of the bias, but Type II errors would be more likely 
with monthly data if no adjustments were made for the bias caused by the shift in the coefficients” (Morse, 
1984: 616 ).
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degree of flexibility of the de facto exchange rates regimes. We will return to this issue 
when we discuss the results of our estimates.
n  Exchange rate regimes estimations
This Section presents the results of the exchange rate regime estimation for each 





De facto exchange rate regimes for Argentina
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2002-01-02 0.000 0.996*** -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.99
0.896 0.000 0.909 0.595 0.725   
2002-01-09 2002-07-03 5.508* 106.315 76.212 27.765 30.237 105.76 0.09
0.035 0.391 0.362 0.382 0.396   
2002-07-10 2004-08-25 -0.169 1.477 0.562 -0.115 0.316 1.476 0.18
0.160 0.612 0.817 0.895 0.730   
2004-09-01 2008-04-16 0.041 0.817** -0.065 -0.077 -0.069 0.113 0.64
0.104 0.007 0.815 0.467 0.442   
2008-04-23 2011-12-21 0.169** 0.336 -0.528 -0.185 -0.319 0.650 0.37
0.005 0.678 0.467 0.333 0.213   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: *
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The estimation for Argentina yields five exchange rate regimes. The first one cor-
responds to the last years of the convertibility regime, in place since 1992. The model 
accurately predicts the structural change in January, 2002, when the Congress voted for 
the derogation of the convertibility regime.
The second period accounts for the six months that follow the initial overshooting 
of the exchange rate, after a sharp devaluation. The error variance of the model, σe2, is 
extraordinarily high, so the R2 is almost zero. During these months, Argentina experi-
enced the most important substitution of local financial assets (money and deposits) by 
external assets (foreign reserves). This substitution is reflected in the nominal exchange 
rate, which was devaluated 260% during the first semester of 2002. The intercept, posi-
tive and significant, accounts for this sharp depreciation of the peso.
According to Frenkel and Rapetti: “…The divergent trends seem to have been re-
verted by July, 2002, and the exchange market became more stable” (Frenkel and Ra-
petti, 2007: 7). The model yields a structural change in that date, and sets the beginning 
of a third period with a lower variance and higher R2 that reflects the adjustments in 
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place.8 The intercept goes far beyond the value reach in the previous period, reflecting 
some degree of appreciation. But this trend was stopped by the dynamic of the local 
financial markets: as the rates of return of local assets began to growth, Central Bank 
bonds rapidly became attractive substitutes to the dollar. 
In line with other exchange rate characterizations, our model yields a break in Au-
gust, 2004. Simkievich (2009) analyzes the 2002-2006 period and finds two regimes: 
2002-2003 and 2004-2006. The author finds that in this last period, the Central Bank 
made a major turn in its behavior by announcing for the first time a monetary aggregate 
target in its Annual Monetary Program.9 
A last break is found in April, 2008, when the government imposed agricultural ex-
ports taxes. This set off the demand for dollars due to political uncertainty, which meant a 
drastic drain in the international reserves and, thus, a significant depreciation of the peso. 
The model estimates six exchange rate regimes in Brazil, some of which coincide 
with the classification of Silva Jr. (2010), who estimates four regimes based on a mea-
sure of “exchange rate stress”. A first break is found in January, 1999, when the Central 
Bank of Brazil communicated its decision of letting the exchange rate float, after al-
most a decade of a tight dollar peg.10
8 According to the authors, the causes of the relative stability achieved in this period are: a) the exchange rate 
controls over cross-border financial transactions, implemented since March, 2002; b) the systematic inter-
vention in the exchange market since Roberto Lavagna assumed as head of the Ministry of Economy; c) the 
decision to oblige Argentine exporters to liquidate export receivables over USD 1 million at the Central Bank, 
which enormously contributed to increase foreign reserves.
9 The Monetary Program was officially announced in June, 2003. It consisted of three quantitative monetary 
goals: a minimum level for foreign reserves, and a maximum level for net domestic assets and for broad mo-
netary base. 
10 The Real jumped from 1.21 to 1.52 in January, to 1.90 BRL/USD in March.
Figure 1
Weekly returns for the argentinian peso. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
Source: Author’s calculations.
















































De facto exchange rate regimes for Brazil
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 1999-05-26 -0.408 -69.447 -41.848 -21.397 -25.091 38.63 0.18
0.852 0.559 0.595 0.520 0.592   
1999-06-02 2002-05-29 0.230* 0.803 -0.176 0.373 -0.042 1.94 0.11
0.044 0.555 0.823 0.341 0.934   
2002-06-05 2003-01-29 0.579 -27.253 -21.778 -8.382 -6.942 12.74 0.14
0.444 0.552 0.518 0.493 0.612   
2003-02-05 2008-08-27 -0.248** -1.840 -2.080 -0.815* -1.039*** 1.71 0.10
0.002 0.076 0.026 0.022 0.001   
2008-09-03 2009-01-14 -0.348 -8.347 -8.422 -1.866 -4.297 9.94 0.49
0.724 0.316 0.267 0.326 0.110   
2009-01-21 2011-12-21 -0.168 -4.870*** -3.939** -0.920** -1.860*** 1.26 0.26
0.072 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.000   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: *
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2
Weekly returns for the brazilian real.
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
The second period begins in June, 1999, when the BCB announced the adoption of 
an IT scheme which has been in place ever since. The de facto indicator is consistent 
with an IT regime. In fact, in 2002, the BCB practiced a strong devaluation of the 
Real as a reaction to the inflationary shock. After the shock induced by the Argentinian 
crisis, the fourth period (2003-2008) reflects the IT in operation. By 2006, the BCB 
Source: Author’s calculations.






















achieved the inflation target mainly by exchange rate appreciation, as it is reflected by 
the significance of the intercept in this period.
The last two regimes reflect the effects of the financial turmoil of 2008. The first 
months were characterized by high exchange rate volatility. The model yields a break 
in January, 2009, when the BCB reduced the policy interest rate from 13.75% at the be-
ginning of the year to 11.5% in March. The degree of flexibility is lower, which reflects 
the BCB’s foreign exchange intervention policy.
Chile
Table 4
De facto exchange rate regimes for Chile
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2008-01-02 0.024 0.296 -0.340 -0.078 -0.214 0.97 0.13
0.603 0.388 0.162 0.554 0.105   
2008-01-09 2011-12-21 -0.064 -1.910 -1.654 -0.449 -0.951 2.31 0.09
0.558 0.197 0.213 0.199 0.041   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: * 
Source: Author’s calculations.
The estimates for the Chilean exchange rate regimes yield one structural change in 
2008. The Central Bank of Chile has been autonomous since 1989. That same year, it 
adopted a hybrid IT scheme, combined with fluctuation bands for the exchange rate. 
The bands were meant to stabilize the functioning of the external payments system, so 
that they became an implicit target for the current account deficit (Céspedes, 2010). 
Figure 3
 Weekly returns for the chilean peso. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
Source: Author’s calculations.



































In 1999, Chile adopted a floating exchange rate regime and made the IT scheme 
explicit. Since then, the BCCh intervene in the exchange market in three occasions: Au-
gust, 2001, October, 2002, and April, 2008. The estimated break is placed in January, 
2008, when the BCCh announced the beginning of a reserve accumulation program.
Colombia
Table 5
De facto exchange rate regimes for Colombia
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2005-04-13 0.128* 0.974* -0.063 0.037 0.032 0.90 0.23
0.017 0.025 0.831 0.811 0.854   
2005-04-20 2006-03-22 -0.067 2.178 1.038 0.446 0.316 0.06 0.82
0.076 0.424 0.670 0.595 0.714   
2006-03-29 2009-10-28 -0.029 -1.278 -1.038 -0.658* -0.914* 3.02 0.11
0.821 0.291 0.344 0.039 0.015   
2009-11-04 2011-12-21 -0.066 -0.808 -0.939 -0.007 -0.420 0.87 0.06
0.476 0.527 0.406 0.982 0.316   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: *
Author’s calculations. 
Figure 4
Weekly returns for the colombian peso. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
The estimated model for Colombia yields three structural breaks. Until 1999, Co-
lombia had a hybrid scheme of monetary aggregate targets and fluctuation bands. The 
monetary aggregates where supposed to fluctuate within a “corridor” based on esti-
mates of the demand for money, inflation, output growth and interest rates. As for the 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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exchange rate, the bands were set in +/- 7%, and the Central Bank also established rules 
for intervention. By the late nineties, the Asian crises ended up with the defense of the 
bands, forced a devaluation of the Colombian Peso and pushed for the adoption of a 
pure floating exchange rate regime, which was combined with an IT scheme. 
In 2005, the Colombian Peso registered an appreciation of 8%, which contributed to 
an increase in capital inflows. Additionally, commodities prices were rising and so did 
the terms of trade. In order to avoid an excessive appreciation of the Peso, the Central 
Bank practiced discretionary interventions that diminished exchange rate appreciation 
(Hernández Monsalve and Mesa, 2009). By March, 2006, the trend was reverted and 
the exchange rate reached prior levels.
According to Vargas, 2010, since 2006, the monetary policy becomes clearly anti-
cyclical: until 2009, the Central Bank gradually increased the reference interest rate 
from 6% to 10% in order to reduce inflationary pressures. In turn, when the interna-
tional crisis unfolded in 2008, the Central Bank reduced the interest rate to compensate 
the shock on the aggregate demand.
Mexico
Table 6
De facto exchange rate regimes for Mexico
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2003-11-26 0.049 1.928*** 0.360 0.180 0.170 0.92 0.34
0.427 0.001 0.320 0.322 0.431   
2003-12-03 2008-08-27 -0.034 -0.278 -0.975 -0.175 -0.488** 0.44 0.29
0.426 0.621 0.063 0.371 0.005   
2008-09-03 2009-06-17 0.359 -3.263 -3.145 -0.674 -1.590 6.02 0.17
0.395 0.523 0.490 0.545 0.304   
2009-06-24 2011-12-21 -0.066 -2.857* -2.773* -0.497 -1.499*** 0.96 0.27
0.455 0.031 0.018 0.124 0.001   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: *
Source: Author’s calculations.
The model yields four de facto exchange rate regimes for Mexico. On December 
22nd, 1994, Mexico abandoned the fluctuation bands system and adopted a pure float-
ing exchange rate regime that remains officially to the present. Also, since 2001, the 
Banxico adopted an explicit IT scheme.
Between 1995 and 2003, the inflation rate decreased from 52% to 4%. Once price 
and financial stability have been attained, the Banxico implemented several measures 
conducive to the adoption of an operating interest rate target: first, the target level 
for banks’ current account balances at the central bank (the “corto”) was no longer 
determined based on accumulated balances but instead on daily balances; second, the 
Banxico decided to announce its monetary policy stance on pre-established dates. 































The model yields a break at the end of 2003, when the Banxico reacted to inflation-
ary pressures by tightening its monetary policy through an increase in the level of the 
“corto” and in the specific level of “monetary conditions” or interest rates (Banxico, 
Inflation Report, June-September, 2007). Besides, until October, 2008, US dollars were 
auctioned daily in order to reduce the pace of accumulation of international reserves.
The last two breaks are associated with the financial crisis of 2008. The first six 
months registered the highest exchange rate volatility, despite Banxico’s strong interven-
tion in the foreign exchange markets through different mechanisms (direct intervention, 
daily and extraordinary auctions, swap lines with the FED, among others). The Mexican 
Peso was depreciated in about 26% in a year, and became stable since April, 2009. 
The last break estimated is placed in June, 2009. Since the second semester, the 
Mexican economy started a slow recovery and by the end of the year real GDP regis-
tered an annual growth of 5.5%, after the 6.1% contraction in 2008. In turn, between 
2009 and 2011, there is a slight appreciation trend, which contributed to reduce the 
overall inflation rate from 5.30% in 2009 to 3.82% in 2011, which is still above the 3% 
annual target set by the monetary authorities.
The estimated model for Peru yields six breaks. The exchange rate regime for the 
first two periods do not match with the officially declared by the Banco Central de 
Reserva del Perú (BCRP), which claims to have adopted a flexible regime in 1990 and 
an IT scheme since 2002. Between 2002 and 2004, the monetary authorities intervened 
in the foreign exchange markets to counteract the excessive depreciation of the cur-
rency prompted by the uncertainty about the Brazilian electoral process.
In August, 2005, the model yields another break that is consistent with the facts 
described in the Memory of the BCRP: “The evolution of the nominal exchange rate 
shows two different dynamics in 2005. From January to August, the Sol continued to 
Figure 5
Weekly returns for the mexican peso. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
Source: Author’s calculations.
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exhibit appreciation pressures (a trend that started in 2003). Since August, 2005, the 
exchange rate started to de-link from its fundamentals. This is explained by the re-
composition of currency portfolios and the political uncertainty due to the electoral 
process”. (BCRP, Memory 2005, pp. 39-40. Translation by the author).
Figure 6
Weekly returns for the peruvian soles. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
Peru
Table 7
De facto exchange rate regimes for Peru
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2002-12-11 0.051 0.674 -0.203 -0.196 -0.162 0.23 0.53
0.140 0.110 0.418 0.115 0.308   
2002-12-18 2005-01-19 -0.069** 1.126 0.077 0.072 0.031 0.05 0.87
0.003 0.062 0.881 0.695 0.876   
2005-01-26 2005-08-17 -0.009 0.084 -0.860* -0.286* -0.329* 0.00 1.00
0.242 0.841 0.037 0.037 0.030   
2005-08-24 2006-06-07 0.006 -7.185 -7.778 -2.227 -2.709 0.38 0.52
0.954 0.493 0.404 0.491 0.414   
2006-06-14 2007-09-12 -0.043 0.350 -0.523 -0.170 -0.163 0.03 0.79
0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056   
2007-09-19 2009-10-28 -0.089 0.272 -0.227 -0.148 -0.286 0.99 0.16
0.373 0.722 0.739 0.436 0.215   
2009-11-04 2011-12-21 -0.066* 0.345 -0.539 -0.036 -0.178 0.11 0.73
0.048 0.449 0.183 0.748 0.235   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: * 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Between August, 2005, and January, 2006, a sharp devaluation was triggered by 
massive dollar purchases by pension funds administrators, when it became public that 
Ollanta Humala leaded the surveys. At the beginning of the episode, the BCRP did not 
intervene, but later it was forced to do so in order to avoid an even greater depreciation 
of the local currency. Finally, at the beginning of 2006, the exchange rate was stabilized 
and started a slow upward trend. However, the monetary authorities’ fear of floating 
was still very strong: despite having inflation rates under control, the BCRP decided to 
raise the reference interest rate by 0.25% (Alonso et al., 2010).
In October, 2009, the model yields another break. The financial crisis forced an 
important cut in the reference interest rate, from 6.5% in January to 1.25% in August, 
2009. However, it was again set in 3% by December, 2010. 
In this last period, the BCRP intervened in the foreign exchange markets in order to 
reduce excessive exchange rate volatility.
Venezuela
Table 8
De facto exchange rate regimes for Venezuela
Start End Intercept USD/XDR EUR/XDR GBP/XDR JPY/XDR σe2 R2
1999-01-13 2002-01-30 0.187*** 0.955*** 0.004 -0.065 -0.032 0.03 0.87
0.000 0.000 0.973 0.197 0.639   
2002-02-06 2003-02-19 0.988 53.912 35.971 13.131 16.443* 18.43 0.19
0.157 0.052 0.073 0.081 0.046   
2003-02-26 2004-02-04 -0.002 1.200*** 0.166 0.052 0.054 0.00 1.00
0.475 0.000 0.105 0.145 0.158   
2004-02-11 2005-03-09 0.452 6.874 5.293 0.294 2.233 6.58 0.22
0.217 0.712 0.761 0.960 0.723   
2005-03-16 2009-11-04 0.000 1.014*** 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.00 1.00
0.941 0.000 0.477 0.563 0.488   
2009-11-11 2010-03-24 3.841 34.666 32.764 0.315 5.286 75.26 0.37
0.168 0.795 0.792 0.992 0.904   
2010-03-31 2011-12-21 0.000 1.012*** 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.00 1.00
0.993 0.000 0.382 0.280 0.480   
Note: below the coefficients is shown the p-value. Signif. codes: 0.001: ***  0.01: **  0.05: * 
Source: Author’s calculations.
The model for Venezuela yields six de facto regimes that alternate hard pegs to the 
dollar and brief periods of floatation. In the first period, the de facto regime matches the 
de jure regime in place from July, 1996, to January, 2002, when Venezuela adopted a 
fluctuation bands system. However, the R2 is quite low. Schliesser (2004) analyses the 
same period and finds that the active intervention in the exchange rate market and the 
interest rate impeded greater movements of the exchange rate.
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The second period starts in February, 2002. Since 2001, the decrease in the foreign 
reserves due to the fall in the oil price put pressure on the Central Bank of Venezuela, 
which ultimately stop defying the fluctuation bands and adopted a floating scheme, as 
reflected by the R2 and the extraordinary value in the error variance of this period. 
Figure 7
Weekly returns for the venezuelan bolívar fuerte. 
Structural breaks and confidence intervals (95%)
On March 3, 2005, the Government of Venezuela practiced a devaluation of the Bolívar 
and fixed an exchange rate of Bs. 2.150. The de facto indicator shows great fixation, de-
spite the monetary authorities not announcing the abandonment of the floating regime.
In 2008, the Bolívar was revalued at a ratio of 1 to 1000 and renamed Bolívar 
Fuerte. This implied just a re-scaling in the value of the currency. In January, 2010, the 
Government practiced a dual devaluation that reached 20% for oil-related sectors and a 
100% for non-oil economic sectors.
The model yields a break at the end of 2009, due to the instability triggered by the 
financial crisis. During the first week of 2011, the Government announced the unification 
of the exchange rate system. This implied a devaluation of around 60% of the value of the 
currency, reflected in the extraordinarily high value of the error variance in this period.
n  Discussion of results: exchange rate regimes in Latin America
In this section, we discuss the results of the estimates of the de facto exchange rate 
regimes. Table 9 presents the de facto regime indicator –the R2– jointly with the IMF 
classification.11 As the R2 decreases, the regime becomes more flexible, so it is an indi-
cator of the degree of inflexibility.  
11 Until 1998, the IMF compiled the de jure exchange rate arrangements from national sources in its Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Since 1998, in response to criticism that there 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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In order to make them comparable, we use IMF periodization and R2 averages for 
every period.
Table 9
De facto exchange rates vs. IMF classification
Period Countries EXCHANGE RATE REGIME MONETARY POLICY
FRAMEWORKDe facto IMF classification
Up to June, 
2003
Argentina 0.71 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
Monetary aggregate 
target
Brazil 0.12 Independently floating  IT framework
Chile 0.13 Independently floating  IT framework
Colombia 0.23 Independently floating  IT framework
Mexico 0.34 Independently floating  IT framework
Peru 0.57 Independently floating  IT framework
Venezuela 0.71 Other conventional fixed peg Exchange rate anchor
Up to June, 
2004
Argentina 0.18 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
Monetary aggregate 
target
Brazil 0.12 Independently floating  IT framework
Chile 0.13 Independently floating  IT framework
Colombia 0.23 Independently floating  IT framework
Mexico 0.34 Independently floating  IT framework
Peru 0.71 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
 IT framework
Venezuela 0.56 Other conventional fixed peg Exchange rate anchor
Up to July, 
2008
Argentina 0.62 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
Monetary aggregate 
target
Brazil 0.10 Independently floating  IT framework
Chile 0.13 Independently floating  IT framework
Colombia 0.32 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
 IT framework
Mexico 0.29 Independently floating  IT framework
Peru 0.67 Managed floating/no pre-announced path
for the exchange rate
 IT framework
Venezuela 0.86 Other conventional fixed peg Exchange rate anchor
were significant differences between de jure and de facto policies, the  IMF shifted to compiling unofficial 
data and started to publish its own de facto classification, available on http://www.imf.org/external/NP/mfd/
er/index.aspx . We compare our de facto indicator with the IMF classification because, unlike others, it has 
various categories (not only fixed-floating) and it is up to date.
De facto exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting...    n 49
Period Countries EXCHANGE RATE REGIME MONETARY POLICY
FRAMEWORKDe facto IMF classification
Up to April, 
2012
Argentina 0.37 Crawl-like arrangement Monetary aggregate 
target
Brazil 0.27 Floating  IT framework
Chile 0.10 Free Floating  IT framework
Colombia 0.08 Floating  IT framework
Mexico 0.25 Free Floating  IT framework
Peru 0.49 Floating  IT framework
Venezuela 0.93 Conventional peg US dollar anchor
Source: The R2 is used to indicate the de facto exchange rate. The periods were set according to changes observed 
in the mean R2 of all the countries in the sample. The IMF classification of 2008 was released in April. In the last 
IMF classification (released in April, 2012), the names of some categories were changed, but the methodology 
remains the same: “independently floating” became “free floating”, and “managed floating” was replaced by 
“crawling arrangements. 
Table 9 evinces similarities and differences between both classifications: 
l Argentina and Venezuela experienced periods of high and low exchange rate flex-
ibility, but this instability is not reflected by the IMF classification.  
l  Mexico is classified as an “independent floater with an IT framework” by the IMF, 
but its de facto regime indicator, the R2, has been higher (i.e., less flexible) than that 
of other ITers. 
l  Chile is also an “independent floater with IT scheme” for the IMF, which is consis-
tent with the de facto indicator (constant and low R2 for all the periods). 
l  According to the IMF, Colombia was an “independent floater” until 2004, became a 
“managed floater” in 2006, and went back to “free floating” in the last period. The 
de facto indicator also captured these changes. 
l  Peru was classified by the IMF as a “managed floater” and in the last period it 
turned to “floating”. The de facto indicator partially coincides with this classifica-
tion: the R2 is generally high and slightly decreases in the last period. Contrarily, 
Brazil went from “independent floater” to “floater” in the last period. The de facto 
indicator actually captures the decreasing flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
In summary, there are significant differences in the degree of flexibility between 
ITers and Non-ITers, which are captured by both classifications. However, our de facto 
estimates yield a “fine structure” of the exchange rate regimes that allows for dissimi-
larities also between ITers. We now turn to compare ITers with Non-ITers, and then 
ITers among themselves.
ITers vs. Non-ITers
Figure 8 evinces the differences in the degree of inflexibility (R2) between ITers and 
Non-ITers. Argentina and Venezuela are shown separately because, unlike ITers which 
have more or less floating systems, they do not share the same regime: Venezuela has 
50 n EconoQuantum Vol. 11. Núm. 1
a hard peg to the dollar occasionally interrupted by devaluations, while Argentina has 
a managed regime. During the period under analysis, both countries experienced large 
swings in the degree of flexibility of their regimes, despite the frequent interventions 
and controls imposed to their exchange rate markets. 
Figure 8
Mean R2 ITers vs. Argentina and Venezuela
Conversely, ITers have maintained a high and constant degree of flexibility over 
the last decade (an average R2 of around 0.30). Their exchange rate regimes have been 
flexible but not as volatile as what could be expected in a freely floating system. This 
reflects an idiosyncratic characteristic of ITers in developing regions: the role of the 
exchange rate is much more prominent than in advanced economies, and there is often 
a commitment to avoid excessive exchange rate volatility. Therefore, although the pri-
mary policy instrument is the reference interest rate, IT– central banks of developing 
countries also use reserve requirements and foreign exchange intervention as supple-
mentary instruments. 
The de facto flexibility in the exchange rate regimes could partially explain why 
ITers seem to have coped better with the commodity price and financial shocks of 
2007-2009. When the crisis unfolded, ITers have already completed the phase of dis-
inflation after the adoption of an IT regime, as shown in Table 10. Price stability may 
have permitted these countries to lower their interest rates and absorb part of the shocks 
mainly through an initial exchange rate depreciation and loss of international reserves, 
without triggering an exchange rate crisis, as in past episodes of external shocks (Al-
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Table 10
Inflation targeting in LA-7 countries. Adoption dates and disinflation periods
Country Effective IT 
adoption
CPI inflation rate at 
start of disinflation
Disinflation period CPI inflation rate at 
stable targeting
Stable IT period
Brazil 1999M6 3.3 1999M6–2005M12 5.7 2006M1–present
Chile 1999M9 3.2 1999M9–2000M12 4.5 2001M1–present
Colombia 1999M9 9.3 1999M9–present   
Mexico 2001M1 9 2001M1–2002M12 5.7 2003M1–present
Peru 2002M1 −0.1 2002M1–present   
Source: Roger (2010). 
Contrarily, Argentina and Venezuela had less room for monetary policy and ex-
change rate policy in 2008, as they were facing high inflation rates since the beginning 
of the commodity shock. 
Figure 9
Inflation rates (a) and policy interest rates (b) in LA-7 countries
Source: CEPALSTAT and www.inflacionverdadera.com for Argentina’s inflation in 2009 and 2011.
Comparison between ITers
Although ITers have quite flexible regimes, they are not pure floaters and they do not 
float the same way. The differences in the degree of flexibility of their regimes es-
timated in this work may arise from the frequency and amount of foreign exchange 
interventions, as shown in Figure 10. 
With the exception of Chile,12 all ITers in our sample have significantly intervened 
in their foreign exchange markets over the last decade. Purchases were the more preva-
12 The Central Bank of Chile also intervened in 2001 and 2002, but the amounts were not significant.
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Figure 10
ITers-Foreign exchange intervention and bilateral exchange rate
Source: Author’s calculations based on the basis of central banks data. Positive values refer to purchases, whereas 
negative values refer to sales. Upward movements of the exchange rate correspond to depreciations. 
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lent operation, which could imply that intervention in these countries may be associated 
with the avoidance of appreciation trends and also with reserve accumulation. 
Brazil and Peru could be characterized as “heavy interveners”. Also, our model 
identified many exchange rate regimes for these countries, with different degrees of 
flexibility, which approximately follow the pattern of interventions. These could sug-
gest that these central banks may have certain concern about excessive exchange rate 
volatility. Indeed, Peru has explicitly stated this objective by setting thresholds, but 
Brazil has not and its intervention has been discretionary. 
Conversely, in Colombia, the monetary authorities seem to have responded to ap-
preciation trends rather than to exchange rate volatility. This is consistent with the 
results of our model, which shows that Colombia has an intermediate degree of flex-
ibility. 
Chile and Mexico have both made the announcement of a reserve accumulation 
program: Chile in April, 2008, and Mexico in February, 2010; officially, their monetary 
authorities have stated that these episodes of intervention had no intention to influence 
the exchange rate. But despite being both “low interveners”, unlike the central bank of 
Chile, the Banxico has had a concern for exchange rate stability over the last decade, 
which is reflected in the quite low degree of flexibility of its de facto regime.
n  Concluding remarks
To assess changes in the de facto exchange rate regimes of the countries enlisted in LA-
7, we have used the method proposed by Zeileis et al. (2010) for estimating structural 
breaks in a Frankel-Wei model. The method allows testing for changes in the coef-
ficients and also the error variance by adopting a quasi-normal density function in the 
Bai-Perron (2003) framework. 
The empirical results suggest that there are significant differences between ITers 
and Non-ITers in relation to the degree of flexibility of their regimes. Moreover, track-
ing the regimes through the financial turmoil of 2008, the evidence shows that ITers 
absorbed a great part of the shock through movements in their exchange rates, with-
out prompting an exchange rate crisis. Conversely, Argentina and Venezuela could not 
avoid an increase in the pace of their inflation rates, that were already high by the 
middle of the decade. 
However, ITers were found to be less flexible than what could be expected. With the 
exception of Chile, ITers exhibited certain degree of “fear of floating”, which may have 
induced them to practice interventions in order to avoid excess exchange rate volatility, 
appreciation trends or reserve accumulation. 
A concern for the exchange rate and an operating IT scheme are not possible within 
the “bipolar view” framework. However, Latin American ITers seem to have managed 
to do so in a context of high international liquidity. Therefore, the efficiency and sus-
tainability of this particular monetary and exchange rate framework remain to be tested 
under different conditions.
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n  Appendix 1
 Structural changes in exchange rate series
To find the optimal number of breaks, we run the dating procedure for a minimum of 
20 observations and a maximum of m=10 structural breaks. The information criteria for 
choosing the optimal number of breaks are the Negative Log-Likelihood and Bayesian 
Information Criteria. When there is no change in the slope, we use the following rule of 
thumb: the optimal number of breaks is that for which additional breaks do not signifi-
cantly diminish the value of the criteria.
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